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Aline Rose Barbosa Pereira, Belo Horizonte/ Brazil* 
 
Law, Language and Science 
Work in Progress 
 
Abstract:  This  paper is  aimed  to  re-elaborate  questions  and  discuss  them  rather  than  presenting 
answers. It starts with the dialog concerning specific contributions of philosophy of language to Law, 
followed by the re-elaboration of some yet unanswered problems, as well as the discussion of possible 
paths for this issue. 
Keywords: Jurisprudence, philosophy of Law, speech acts, democracy 
 
I. Introduction – About science and language 
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce problems, or to better elaborate relevant issues 
for  discussion,  rather  than  to  propose  answers.  It  is  to  put  the  importance  of  the 
intersubjective validation into practice aiming not only the results of one study, but the entire 
research’s process of development. In order to do so, the paper starts with the most visible 
philosophy of language’s contributions to Law, followed by the re-elaboration of some yet 
unanswered problems as well as the discussion of possible paths for this issue.  
The relation that exists between words and the knowledge of reality has always been 
discussed in philosophy. If, on one hand, the naturalistic thesis
1 could not sustain itself, the 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign originated in conventionalism leaded to the belief that 
language could not bring any contribution to knowledge, for being merely the way to express 
an  autonomous  and  previously  acquired  knowledge  (Plato,   Cratylus:  438a-b).  Socrates’ 
speech in the above mentioned dialogue clarifies it:  
[438d-e]: Socrates: in this struggle between names, in which some of them are presented 
as similar to the truth, while others state the same thing of themselves, which criteria will 
we adopt and to whom should we call upon? Evidently, not to other names rather than 
those, because there are no others. It is obvious that we will have to look outside the 
names for something that allows us to see, without the names, which one of the classes is 
the real one, what will be demonstrated by its indication of the truth to us. (highlighted 
by the author) 
 
                                                           
* Master student in Philosophy of Law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais and Lawyer. 
1 According to naturalism there is a natural relation between the sign and the object the language addresses. 
(MARCONDES, 2010: 14). This idea is put into question by the diversity of natural languages (different 
languages spoken by different peoples]. 2 
The idea of the language being only a means of expression of thoughts and of “mental 
entities” (Aristotle) or concepts (Descartes) – both essential to the development of knowledge 
–  as  well  as  an  instrument  for  description  of  the  reality,  predominated  during  centuries. 
Descartes  made  this  relation  in  terms  similar  to  those  proposed  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  St. 
Augustine and other antecessors: language would be a source of mistake, a barrier to the true 
knowledge of things, an imperfect means of expression of thought (MARCONDES, 2010: 
43). 
At most, language has been seen as a carrier of an instrumental value for making feasible 
the exchange of ideas between the scientific community and, thenceforward, the development 
of science. Locke’s observations evolved according to this view, and he has seen in language 
– even though it could undergo abuses, because of the frequently bad word use by men – 
“[…] the vehicle par excellence through which men transmit their findings, reasonings and 
knowledge  to  one  another  […]”  (Essay,  III,  xi,  15).  As  a  rule,  however,  it  was  seen  as 
something negative, which was confusing and precluded human beings from achieving the 
truth.  
It would not fit this paper to precisely define the moment in which a change in these 
conceptions happened. Indeed – which frequently happens in sciences – the origins of what 
would become the philosophy of language of the 20
th century were already there, incipiently, 
in some of these authors’ ideas. One example is the before mentioned importance given by 
Locke to the function of communication, which would make the scientific progress caused by 
the discussion of these theories possible (MARCONDES, 2010: 55-59). 
The notion that to state always means to describe a given reality, be it inner (the thought) 
or  outer  (the  world)  was,  as  seen  before,  accepted  among  philosophers  and  scholars  of 
language for a long time. Nonetheless, it was noticed that describing the states of things 
would  be  solely  one  of  the  possible  functions  of  what,  in  most  of  the  times,  constitutes 
authentic form of action. 
A number of examples could be presented to highlight these uses of language, hitherto 
seen  as  secondary.  One  who,  in  certain  circumstances,  asserts  “I  promise  A”,  is  not 
exteriorizing his intent to make a promise, but rather is performing the action of promising, 
through which one assumes the ethical obligation to do A. 
The  same  applies  to  the  “I  do”  said  by  bride  and  groom  at  the  altar  in  a  marriage 
ceremony. No one would refer to this situation as a simple description, by each one of the 
involved, of their intents to become married with each other, in any situation but a wedding. 3 
By saying “I do” in appropriate circumstances, they do not declare or describe, they do get 
married
2. 
Through these considerations, philosophers such as John Langshaw Austin have put into 
question “[…] the assumption that to say something, at least in all cases worth considering, 
i.e. all cases considered, is always and simply to state something. This assumption is no doubt 
unconscious,  no  doubt  is  precipitate,  but  it  is  wholly  natural  in  philosophy  apparently." 
(AUSTIN 1990: 29; 1976: 12). 
Reflections such as those fall within a movement known as philosophy of language. It is 
based on the idea that only through the consideration of the role and of the objectives of 
language it is possible to have a better understanding of the object the language addresses 
(BLACKBURN, 2007: 154). Ordinary language philosophy or Oxford School, one of the 
lines of this method of analysis that had J. L. Austin as one of its exponents, highlights the 
context of linguistic expressions’ use as well as the constitutive elements of such context: one 
must not consider the language in abstract, but always integrated in its situation of use, since 
this situation will also contribute to the determination of its sense. 
 
II. Brief excursus about Law 
The evolution of Law and of one of its – still discussed – scientific comprehension could not 
be unlinked of the dominant modes of thinking throughout history in other sciences. Also, the 
strict vision of language as a description of a (inner or outer) reality previously given has 
prevailed in the juridical realm for a long time. Paradoxically, in the field in which language 
most widely presents itself as a form of action, there are no references to speech acts, at least 
not in Brazilian legal literature geared to students
3. 
A clear example is the theory of contracts. The fact that Brazilian manuals of Civil Law 
still face contracts as the exchange of “declarations of intent”, or as an externalization of an 
intent  that  already  existed  in  the  intellect  of  the  one  who  declares  it,  has  already  been 
highlighted in previous studies (PEREIRA: 2009). However, to express the intent to do B is 
quite different of doing B. One who, in a specific context, says “I am selling the book X for a 
hundred dollars”, is not externalizing only his intent to sell the book – that is, one is not 
giving only a declaration of intent. One is, in fact, making an offer. If there is acceptance by 
                                                           
2 All mentioned examples highlight what Austin calls illocutionary acts, or acts endowed with a certain 
illocutionary force, notion that will be once again mentioned below.  
3 An exception was found in Luiz Alberto Warat’s writings, who in his book O direito e sua linguagem (among 
others) aims to systematically present the central thesis of philosophy of language, of ordinary language 
philosophy, its contributions to Law, besides the suggestions to problems that still need to be studied by the 
programmatic analysis of law point of view, as it will be mentioned hereafter. 4 
someone else who, in the same context, says “I will buy the book X for a hundred dollars”, 
then both will be actually celebrating a contract of purchase and sale, rather than describing 
their interior states of intent. 
In this same sense the Speech Act Theory by J. L. Austin was elaborated. Among other 
topics, it aims to highlight the illocutionary force of speech acts (AUSTIN, 1976). In other 
words, how one can act through language. 
Although in Brazilian law this characteristic of language has been being widely treated 
with negligence, it was already known in the writings of Adolf Reinach, author of the first 
systematic theory of the promise, request and accusation phenomena, among others (SMITH, 
1990:  2).  Reinach  classifies  a  series  of  speech  acts’  variation,  including  the  social  acts, 
characterized by the fact that theirs expression through language is inseparable of the complex 
whole in which the intent to compromise would also be present. 
What is important about an action of this kind, now, is that it is not divided into the self-
sufficient  execution  of  an  act  and  an  accidental  statement  [Konstatierung];  rather  it 
constitutes  an  inner  unity  of  deliberate  execution  and  deliberate  utterance.  The 
experience is here impossible in the absence of the utterance. And the utterance for its 
part is not something that is added thereto as an incidental extra; rather it stands in the 
service of the social act and is necessary in order that this should fulfill its announcing 
function [kundgebende Funktion]. Certainly there exist also incidental statements relating 
to social acts: “I have just issued the command.” But such statements then relate to the 
whole  social  act,  with  its  external  aspect  (REINACH, op.  cit.,  p.  708,  Eng.  p.  20) 
(apud SMITH, 1990: 13).  
 
Hence, one should cogitate about the necessity of thinking over some basic concepts 
from the investigations of philosophy of language’s point of view also in the case of Law, 
field in which language, written or spoken, is essentially dealt with, and in most cases has 
some illocutionary force. 
 
III. Addressing the definition of problems – proposing some questions 
Once surpassed the vision of language as characterized only of a descriptive function – which 
is quite clear in Law, as previously seen – some questions must be specified. In the first 
period of analytic philosophy, attention should be drawn to the necessity of a precise use of 
words and concepts. One would actually come to think about the elaboration of a formal 5 
language that did not present the “deficiencies” of natural languages: vagueness, ambiguity, 
etc.  
According to  Warat  this  would be the stance taken by logical  positivism.  It  reduces 
philosophy to epistemology, epistemology to semiotics and, highlighting strictly linguistic 
questionings, it asserts the idea that “[…] to make science is to translate data about the world 
in a rigorous language […]” (WARAT, 1995: 37). Broadly, science, language and the criteria 
of recognition of a sentence as scientific would be intermingled with linguistic precision, 
correction  and  verifiability  themselves.  In  Law,  this  model  would  have  reflected  in  the 
logical-formal structure of Kelsen’s Legal Order, as well as in the reduction of the norm to its 
validity
4. (WARAT, 1995, chapter II). 
In the pretension to build an ideal and absolutely precise language with a realistic 
appearance, the strengthening of a vision of the world which aims to maintain the  status quo 
would be present, having in mind the lack of consideration to the historical and social facts 
that influences the law-making and the application of juridical norms (WARAT, 1995: 42). 
The reality, once identified to its theoretical-linguistic reconstruction, would not explicit the 
ideology  of  who  transmits  such  reconstruction,  which  would  hence  be  intermingled  with 
reality itself. 
Reality acquires a value that does not admit any suspicion and, therefore, rejects, from 
the theoretical point of view, the necessity to perform changes. Thus, scientific speech of 
social and juridical sciences loses all possibilities of being converted into a speech of 
denunciation, of diagnosis of both inequality and domination mechanisms. This kind of 
scientific speech is, obviously, a soporific language. (WARAT, 1995: 38, highlighted by 
the author). 
 
Soporific,  for  it  ignores  the  historic  signification  of  norms,  as  if  they  were  neutral 
entities. By moving away scientific speeches from their creation and communication process, 
an univocal illusion would be given, which could be demystified by the pragmatic analysis of 
law
5. (WARAT, 1995: 46-47). “Pragmatics, if extended to Law, allows one to comprehend 
that  ideology  is  a  fact  inseparable  of  the  conceptual  structure  explained  in  general  legal 
norms.” (WARAT, 1995: 47). 
                                                           
4 However, it is important to notice that Kelsen’s model leaves some gaps when it puts social efficacy as a 
condition for validity, which can be observed in the first chapter of the Pure Theory of Law. 
5 Pragmatics such as in Warat’s proposal, rather than the original proposal made by the ordinary language 
philosophy, which, according to him, would not include power relationships. 6 
If one admits the impossibility of a formal language to include the complexity of the 
lifeworld  phenomena,  the  pursuit  of  precision  and  accuracy,  necessary  to  a  scientific 
language, undergoes the attempt to comprehend the way natural languages work (COSTA, 
2008: 126-133). It is the aforementioned ordinary language philosophy, in which a pragmatic 
emphasis in the analysis of problems prevails.  
Philosophy  of  language  is  characterized  by  the  attention  given  to  the  context  of  the 
performance of a speech act, considering its influence in the definition of the sense of speech 
acts and of each term used on them. Here, context is understood in a broader sense, in such a 
way that the subjects involved in the communication process are taken into account, as well as 
their positions (their authority, the specialized knowledge they have – or do not have – about 
Law, their juridical status) and the action intended to be performed through language. 
In fact, one must go beyond the pragmatic approach of philosophy of language to also 
consider, in the communicational situation, the historical and political factors of a bigger 
social context, which increases the problem’s complexity (WARAT, 1995, passim). 
In short, if a Law’s thinking intends to be held as scientific, it should recognize the 
importance of philosophy of language’s contributions (and of Oxford School), and should 
incorporate  them  into  their  practices.  However,  one  must  not  forget  that  the  attention  to 
linguistic aspects involved in Law is a necessary but not sufficient condition to the scientific 
reflection of Law. 
It  is  fundamental  to  raise  law  professionals’  awareness  about  the  responsible 
maneuvering of juridical language. That is, one cannot ignore the necessity to pay attention to 
the precise use of technical juridical terms, as well as to the fact that technical language is not 
the  use  of  complex  words,  neither  the  use  of  forms  of  expression  that  hamper  the 
comprehension of a message or make it become ambiguous. 
It is pretty common among those who work with Law, for example, to use synonyms in 
order to avoid word repetition – which, at a first sight, does not seem to perform any problem. 
Notwithstanding, when it comes to the juridical science’s technical terms, one should prefer 
repetition to a stylistic preoccupation that might hamper or confuse the comprehension of the 
communicated message. 
Another frequent situation is the appropriation of common language terms that acquire a 
new conceptual content in technical-juridical language. The notion of kinship, for instance, is 
not  the  same  when  common  sense’s  concept  is  compared  to  the  juridical  concept.  This 
redefinition  of  day-to-day  terms  in  juridical  language,  when  inevitable,  must  be  at  least 
clarified to the norm addressees.    7 
1. The comprehension by the addressees 
In the juridical realm there is sort of a linguistic habit in which it is not so easy to distinguish 
(in a substantial number of cases) between what is technical and what is similar to stylistic 
complications  or  to  unnecessary  embellishments.  Therefore,  the  challenge  proposed  by 
philosophy of language remains current, which is to think of a language use in science of Law 
concerned  with  the  precision  of  technical  terms,  and,  once  that  is  taken  care  of,  with 
simplicity and the possibility of having the biggest number of addressees’ understanding. 
Comprehension of juridical language is difficult for “not initiated” people, even if they 
have had good education or if they are graduated in another area. This fact should not be 
surprising. The same difficulty in comprehension of the scientific speech happens to those 
who were “not initiated” in Medicine, Engineering or Economics. 
However,  one  should  think  about  the  necessity  for  technical  language  in  Law  to  be 
accessible to the common citizen. Having the assumptions of a democratic rule-of-law state in 
mind, should the participation of citizens in the construction of the public sphere be taken into 
account as a formal requirement? Although the ignorance of a norm does not excuse anyone 
from complying with it, can Law consider itself satisfied with a fiction
6 or should it first 
contribute to guarantee juridical knowledge to the population? With no ambition to exhibit 
definite answers to these questions, but rather in order to cl arify their relevance, some ideas 
concerning subjects of a right’s participation in the construction and implementation of an 
allegedly democratic society will hereafter be exposed. 
According  to  Habermas,  private  and  public  autonomies  are  co-originated  and 
reciprocally presuppose one another (HABERMAS, 1997). The former relates to subjective 
rights and can only exist in a community in which citizens see themselves as equals and as 
carriers of the same rights, which happens in a dialogical process – thus, through language. 
However, the fact that this communicative action implies the use of public autonomy should 
be stressed. When citizens prescribe and recognize duties and rights, they contribute to the 
construction  of  the  public  sphere,  and  such  contribution  is  a  requirement  for  current 
democracies’ legitimacy. This requirement would be the idea of subjects of a right taking part 
at the construction of the legal order that will govern them. 
Nevertheless, one could question whether an effective democratic rule-of-law state can or 
cannot satisfy itself with a requisite that is mostly only formally accomplished, since juridical 
language (among other factors) hampers comprehension of law by common citizens and, thus, 
influences their effective action in the construction of the public sphere. 
                                                           
6 In Brazilian legal theory, this is technically understood as a “legal assumption”, rather than as a fiction. 
Anyhow, ordinary citizens do not know most of the norms.  8 
This factor would reflect on a limitation to private autonomy itself, since the ignorance 
about rights (be it subjective or fundamental) would affect the way the person conducts her 
own juridical sphere: life projects that one plans and the means one uses to achieve them - 
which could  also  include the pursuit  of the accomplishment  of fundamental  rights  in  the 
public sphere. 
Hence, there is a series of restrictions to the citizen’s public and private autonomies in 
the lifeworld, what is reflected on the biggest difficulties in the achievement of fundamental 
rights and may become a threat to the effectiveness of a rule-of-law state – an even more 
considerable threat in an allegedly democratic state. Public and private autonomy, as well as 
public and private spheres, presuppose one another. 
 
2. Brief considerations about historical and political factors 
As  previously  mentioned,  the  pragmatic  approach  of  law  should  go  beyond  the  ordinary 
language philosophy’s proposal, so as to also take into consideration historical and political 
factors  that  manifest  in  language  and  in  the  application  of  law.  By  acting  like  this,  the 
pragmatic analysis would be: 
[…] a good instrument to the formation of critical jurists, who would not perform naïve 
and superficial  readings of norms, but  who would rather try to  discover connections 
between words in the law as well as political and ideological facts that produce and 
determine their functions in society. (WARAT, 1995: 47). 
 
Hence, aspects such as persuasion, achievement of legitimacy and even domination (in a 
lot of cases obtained through the word of an authority invested in a powerful position, what 
cannot be intermingled with the rational conviction of the ones who are involved) should be 
noticed. As some social-linguistic authors remind, “it would not be appropriate to neglect 
factors such as power and domination relationships, which govern the restrict or generalized 
use of a [language] code.” (BAGNO, 2009: 160). Then, it is important to make deeper studies 
of such questions. 
When  it  comes  to  political  factors  in  law,  a  possible  path  might  be  the  analysis  of 
Bordieu’s concept of symbolic power, which institutes juridical authority (and thus Law) as 
the “form par excellence of legitimate symbolic violence whose monopoly belongs to the 
state, and that can be combined with the use of physical force”. (BORDIEU, 2007: 211). 
Bordieu asserts the existence of a social space (field) and of a mode of action internalized 
by subjects, which would be originated in the assumption that law constitutes an autonomous 9 
social universe (with respect to external influences), which is based on itself and has a logic 
of its own
7. Juridical authority would be produced and performed in this autonomous social 
universe. It is important to notice that the beliefs shared by subjects concerning this autonomy 
(as well as concerning rationality and universality of Law and its conflict solving method) 
would be a condition for the possibility of the symbolic power exercised by Law. 
 
The juridical realm is the place to compete for the monopoly of the right to speak of 
rights, that is, the good distribution (nomos) or the good order, in which agents invested 
of competence, at the same time social and technical, face each other, which consists 
essentially in the acknowledged capacity to interpret (in a way more or less free and 
authorized) a body of texts  that establish  the legitimate and  fair vision of the social 
world. And with this condition one can give reasons for the relative autonomy of Law, or 
for the properly symbolic effect of ignorance, which is a result of the illusion of its 
absolute autonomy from external forces. (BORDIEU, 2007: 212). 
 
Also in the context of explaining the effectiveness of such symbolic power, the author 
expresses that the law realm is characterized, among other aspects, by the appeal to “modes of 
arguing”  accepted  as  juridical  by  the  specialized  literature  and  by  jurisprudence  (which 
constitute the symbolic order of juridical norms and of doctrines). These modes of acting and 
arguing, acknowledged as juridical, would be based on law practice (necessarily including its 
language) and would be defined throughout the symbolic dispute between agents endowed 
with juridical competence over the establishment of knowledge concerning law and the right 
interpretation of the norm (the monopoly of the right to state the law). 
The symbolic order of juridical norms and of doctrines, defined by the symbolic dispute 
between law professionals, would determine the “space of possibles”, that is, the possible 
forms of interpretation and of arguing, as well as the conflicts that can be taken to juridical 
appreciation and the language through which they could be expressed when transposed to the 
juridical  realm.  (BORDIEU,  2007:  211-212).  This  “translation”  would  draw  a  boundary 
between 
[…] those who are prepared to join the game and those that, when finding themselves 
hurled in the game, will be held excluded in there, for they are not able to operate the 
                                                           
7 As it will be hereafter explained, this field would also have a language of its own, which would combine with 
elements taken from common language as well as elements that did not belong to it – elements typically from the 
juridical world. (BORDIEU, 2007: 215). 10 
conversion of all the mental space – and, in particular, of all the linguist posture – which 
supposes the entry into this social space. (BORDIEU, 2007: 225). 
 
The interested part would hold, hence, oblivious to what is happening in the process 
destined to “solve” his problem. And this consequence would not happen by chance, but 
would rather be constitutive of a power relationship (BORDIEU, 2007: 226) in which the 
person is dispossessed of his vision and reconstruction of the case, and all is delivered to 
specialists  capable  of  dealing  with  this  linguistic  code.  The  inaccessibility  of  juridical 
language can be seen as an instrument of a purposeful restriction of juridical knowledge, 
aiming  to  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  a  structure  of  power  relationships.  From  this 
possible background, which has to be better studied and problematized, the possibility of 
intervening in such system and of altering such reality could be investigated. 
 
IV. Final considerations 
The possibility of comprehension of law by the citizen is connected with at least two factors 
related to language. The first concerns the juridical language itself, which – as previously said 
and as it is planned to study deeper later – should be presented in a simpler way and should be 
more precisely structured. This aspect would be a condition for law’s scientific status, being 
both aspects relevant factors to aim the legitimacy of a rule-of-law state. This is an important 
contribution from philosophy of language and, in this sense, studies concerning speech acts 
can be a fruitful path to follow.  
The  second  aspect  concerns  the  necessity  to  make  qualified  education  available  to 
citizens, especially when considering the bigger development of their linguistic abilities, that 
is, their capacities to comprehend texts (oral or written), to interpret them from their world 
views,  and  to  position  and  justify  themselves  (linguistically).  The  formation  of  citizens 
capable of abilities such as well developed reading, writing and speaking – also to justify 
themselves  as  well  as  the  choices  they  make  before  the  world  –  would  be,  after  all,  a 
condition for the possibility of a more complete democratic experience. 
Furthermore, one should deepen studies in the analysis of juridical language, taking also 
historic and political facts into consideration. Therefore, the use of research methodologies 
that allow the apprehension of such dimensions is essential. The critical discourse analysis 
and the ethnography are here presented as proposals for discussion. 
The former, precisely because of its vision of language as a social practice. The critical 
analysis of discourse sustains that in interpretative processes one should consider, besides the 11 
spoken  or  written  text,  the  inequality  in  accessing  linguistic  resources  by  the  involved 
subjects,  as  well  as  political  and  economical  factors  that  originate  such  inequality  and 
permeate speech and all social context. It is thus a methodology that aims beyond the strictly 
linguistic elements, as previously proposed in this article. 
When it comes to the latter, ethnography, it consists in a method of collecting, describing 
and analyzing data used in social sciences, and, broadly, in anthropology. It is characterized 
by the use of techniques such as partaking observation, interviews and questionnaires, among 
others, which can be used in field researches. 
Law, as an applied social science, should have, in all its analysis, the bigger context of 
the lifeworld, with all its historical, political and ideological constraints. Accordingly, the 
critical discourse analysis as well as field researches that utilize the ethnographic method can 
represent paths so as to apprehend, to comprehend and to reflect about the complexity of the 
object of study. 
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